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Abstract
A model is considered where two ¯rms compete in investing in a risky
project. At certain points in time the ¯rms obtain imperfect information about
the pro¯tability of the project. We impose that investing ¯rst can be bene¯cial
because a Stackelberg advantage, and thus a higher market share, is obtained.
On the other hand, investing as second implies that one can bene¯t from an in-
formation spillover generated by the investment of the other ¯rm. Consequently,
in equilibrium there is either a preemption situation or a war of attrition. In
case no investment takes place during the war of attrition, this war of attrition
can turn into a preemption situation. One counterintuitive result is that welfare
can be negatively a®ected by signals becoming more informative or by occur-
ring more frequently. Furthermore, simulations indicate that duopoly leads to
higher welfare than monopoly when signals are less informative, whereas the
opposite holds if there is more or better information.
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11 Introduction
Two main forces that in°uence a ¯rm's investment decision are uncertainty about the
pro¯tability of the investment project and the behaviour of potential competitors,
having an option to invest in the same project. In this paper the in°uence of
uncertainty and competition on the strategic considerations of a ¯rm's investment
decision and the resulting welfare e®ects are investigated.
The framework we use here assumes imperfect information that arrives stochas-
tically over time. As to the project only two states are possible: either the project
is pro¯table or it yields a loss. Firms have an identical belief in the project being
pro¯table. This belief is updated over time due to information that becomes avail-
able via signals that arrive according to a Poisson process. The signal can either
be good or bad: in the ¯rst case it indicates that the project is pro¯table, whereas
in the latter case investment yields a loss. However, the signals may not provide
perfect information. With an exogenously given ¯xed probability the signal gives
the correct information. For simplicity, it is assumed that the signals can be ob-
served without costs. They can be thought of for example as arising from media
or publicly available marketing research. As an example of the duopoly model with
signals, consider two soccer scouts who are considering to contract a player. In order
to obtain information on the player's quality both scouts go to matches in which
the wanted player plays. If he performs well, this can be seen as a signal indicating
high revenues, but if he performs poorly, this is a signal that the investment is not
pro¯table. This induces an option value of waiting for more signals to arrive and
hence getting a better approximation of the actual pro¯tability of the project.
On the side of the economic fundamentals underlying the model it is assumed
that there are both a ¯rst mover and a second mover advantage. The ¯rst mover
e®ect results from a Stackelberg advantage obtained by the ¯rst investor. The sec-
ond mover advantage arises, because after one of the ¯rms has invested, the true
state of the project becomes known to both ¯rms. The ¯rm that has not invested
yet bene¯ts form this in that it can take its investment decision under complete
information. In this paper it is shown that, depending on the prior beliefs on the
pro¯tability of the project and the magnitudes of the ¯rst and second mover advan-
tages, either a preemption game or a war of attrition arises. The latter occurs if the
information spillover exceeds the ¯rst mover Stackelberg e®ect. In the reverse case a
preemption game arises. Even both types of games may occur in the same scenario:
in a war of attrition there exists a positive probability that no ¯rm undertakes the
investment. Then it may happen { if enough good signals arrive { that at a certain
point in time the ¯rst mover outweighs the information spillover, implying that a
2preemption game arises. It is shown that at the preemption point two things can
happen in equilibrium. Firstly, one ¯rm can invest while the other ¯rm ¯rst waits
to get the information spillover before it decides whether to invest or not. In this
case the resulting market structure is a Stackelberg one. Secondly, both ¯rms can
invest simultaneously, thus resulting in e.g. a Cournot market. in that case both
¯rms prefer a symmetrical situation in the output market above accepting the infor-
mation spillover together with the Stackelberg disadvantage that is obtained upon
investment by the competitor.
In this paper we show that the presence of information streams and uncertainty
concerning the pro¯tability of a new market leads to hybrid welfare results. We in-
vestigate the impact of information on expected ex ante welfare. For the monopoly
case we ¯nd that welfare may in fact be decreasing in the quantity and quality of
the signals. This is mainly due to the fact that when signals appear more frequently
over time, or provide more reliable information, the option value of waiting for more
information increases, which leads to investment at a later date, lowering consumer
surplus. This result may extend to the duopoly case. One would expect that com-
petitive pressure together with better information leads to earlier investment and
thus to higher expected consumer surplus. There is, however, an opposite e®ect
closely linked to the market structure. In equilibrium there is a certain probability
that the actual outcome is a Stackelberg equilibrium. If this is the case and the
market turns out to be bad there is only one ¯rm that looses the sunk investment
costs (namely the leader), while the follower will not invest at all. There is also
a probability that the market ends up in a Cournot equilibrium with simultaneous
investment at the preemption point. If the market turns out to be bad in this case
there are two ¯rms that loose the sunk investment costs. When more information
is available, the information spillover is less valuable. This implies that a Cournot
market will arise with a higher probability when the quality of information rises.
In that case the resulting downward pressure on expected producer surplus (losing
twice the sunk investment costs instead of once) might outweigh the increase in
expected consumer surplus.
Secondly, simulations indicate that for low levels of quantity and quality of the
signals a duopoly yields signi¯cantly higher levels of expected welfare. The intuition
behind this result is straightforward. When the information stream is poor in both
quantity and quality, the option value of waiting for a monopolist is low. Since for
competing ¯rms this value is already low due to competition, the standard dead-
weight loss argument applies here. We also ¯nd, however, that with high levels of
quantity and quality of the signals, monopoly leads to signi¯cantly higher welfare
levels than a duopoly. This is because of two reasons. Firstly, duopoly stimulates
3preemption which is bad for welfare because a signi¯cant value of waiting exists in
case the expected information gain per unit of time is large. Secondly, the possibility
of simultaneous investment in a preemptive duopoly has a negative e®ect on expected
producer surplus, because there exists a possibility that the project turns out to be
bad. These e®ects are larger than the increase in expected consumer surplus.
Most of the literature on optimal investment deals with the e®ects of either
uncertainty or competition. The real option theory concerns itself with investment
decisions under uncertainty (cf. Dixit and Pindyck (1996)). In this literature nature
chooses a state of the world at each point in time, in°uencing the pro¯tability of
the investment project. The problem is then to ¯nd an optimal threshold level of
an underlying variable (e.g. price or output value of the ¯rm), above which the
investment should be undertaken. A recent contribution in this area dealing with
technology adoption is Alvarez and Stenbacka (2001) who include the opportunity
to update the technology with future superior versions.
In the strategic interaction literature a number of models have been developed,
dealing with di®erent situations such as patent races and technology adoption. In
general, a distinction can be made between two types of models. Firstly, there
are preemption games in which two ¯rms try to preempt each other in investing
(cf. Fudenberg and Tirole (1991)). The equilibrium concept used in such games is
developed in Fudenberg and Tirole (1985). Another class is the war of attrition,
which is ¯rst introduced by Maynard Smith (1974) in the biological literature and
later adopted for economic situations (cf. Tirole (1988)). Originally, the war of
attrition describes two animals ¯ghting over a prey. In an economic context one can
think of two ¯rms considering adopting a new technology. Both know that for one
¯rm it would be optimal to invest, but neither wants to be the ¯rst to invest, since
waiting for an even newer technology would be better. The equilibrium concept used
in this type of game is introduced in Hendricks et al. (1988).
The literature combining both aspects is small indeed, see Grenadier (2000) for
a survey. A ¯rst attempt to combine real option theory with timing games was
made in Smets (1991). Huisman (2001) provides some extensions to this approach
and applies this framework to technology adoption problems. Recent contributions
include, e.g., Boyer et al. (2001) and Weeds (2002).
This paper extends the strategic real options literature in the direction of imper-
fect information. Jensen (1982) was the ¯rst to introduce uncertainty and imperfect
information in a one-¯rm-model dealing with technology adoption. The present pa-
per uses an information structure that is similar and which is discussed extensively
in Thijssen et al. (2003) for the one ¯rm case. In Mamer and McCardle (1987)
the impact on the timing of innovation of costs, speed and quality of information
4arriving over time is studied for a one-¯rm model as well as a duopoly. However, due
to an elaborate information structure, Mamer and McCardle (1987) did not obtain
explicit results. Hoppe (2000) considers a duopoly framework in which it is a priori
uncertain whether an investment project is pro¯table or not. The probability with
which the project is pro¯table is exogenously given, ¯xed and common knowledge.
As soon as one ¯rm invests, the true pro¯tability of the project becomes known.
This creates informational spillovers that yield a second mover advantage.
The observation that a game of technology adoption under uncertainty is either
a preemption game or a war of attrition dates back to Jensen (1992a). However,
where Jensen (1992a) examines a two-stage adoption game, the present paper pro-
vides an extension of these results to the case of an in¯nite horizon continuous time
framework. Moreover, as has been mentioned before, in our framework both types
of games can occur within the same scenario. The equilibrium concept that we use
is discussed in detail in Thijssen et al. (2002).
The present paper is related to D¶ ecamps and Mariotti (2000) who also consider
a duopoly model where signals arrive over time. Di®erences are that in D¶ ecamps
and Mariotti (2000) only bad signals exist and that signals are perfectly informative.
This means that after receiving one signal the game is over since the ¯rms are sure
that the project is not pro¯table, while in our framework it could still be possible
that the project is good. In D¶ ecamps and Mariotti it holds that, as long as no signal
arrives, the probability that the project is good continuously increases over time and
the ¯rms are assumed to be asymmetric, which also induces uncertainty regarding
the players' types, whereas we consider identical ¯rms. Furthermore, D¶ ecamps and
Mariotti apply the Bayesian equilibrium concept, whereas in our model this is not
the case. Another implication is that a coordination problem between the two ¯rms
that occurs in our framework is not present in D¶ ecamps and Mariotti (2000). This
coordination problem concerns the issue of which ¯rm will be the ¯rst to invest
in the preemption equilibrium. Another duopoly paper where information arrives
over time is Lambrecht and Perraudin (2003). There, the information relates to the
behaviour of the competitor: each ¯rm has a certain belief about when the other
¯rm will invest and this belief is updated by observing the other ¯rm's behaviour.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2 the model is described. Then,
in Section 3 we analyse the model for the scenario that the ¯rm roles, i.e. leader
and follower, are exogenously determined. In Section 4 the exogenous ¯rm roles
are dropped and the model is analysed for the case where the ¯rms are completely
symmetric. In Section 5 a welfare measure is introduced and welfare e®ects are
discussed. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper.
52 The Model
We consider a situation in which two identical ¯rms have the opportunity to invest
in a project with uncertain revenues. Time is continuous and indexed by t 2 [0;1).
The project can either be good (denoted by H), leading to high revenues, or bad (de-
noted by L), leading to low revenues. From the point of view of strategic behaviour
there ar two possibilities. Let ¿ ¸ 0 denote the ¯rst point in time where investment
takes place. If there is exactly one ¯rm investing at time ¿ this ¯rm is called the
leader. The other ¯rm then automatically becomes the follower. In our model this
pattern of investment leads to Stackelberg competition. A second possibility is that
both ¯rms invest at time ¿, leading to Cournot-Nash competition.
After investment has taken place by at least one ¯rm it is assumed that the state
of the project becomes immediately known to both ¯rms. Hence, in the case where
there is a leader and a follower there is an information spillover from the leader to
the follower, which creates a second mover advantage. In that case, the follower
decides on investment immediately after the true state of the project is revealed. It
is assumed that this does not take any time. So, if one ¯rm invests at time ¿ ¸ 0,
the follower will either invest at time ¿ as well or not at all. We distinguish this
case from the case of simultaneous investment where both ¯rms also invest at the
same time ¿ ¸ 0, but without one of the ¯rms having the second mover advantage.1
That is, in case of simultaneous investment, at the time of investment both ¯rms
are uncertain as to the true state of the project.
In case the project is good the leader's revenue equals UH
L > 0, whereas if the
project is bad the leader's revenue equals UL
L = 0. The sunk costs of investment
are given by I > 0. If the project is good, the follower will immediately invest as
well and gets revenue UH
F > 0. The follower will also incur the sunk costs I. It is
assumed that UH
L > UH
F > I. Hence, there is a ¯rst mover advantage if the project
turns out to yield a high revenue and investment is pro¯table for both ¯rms. If the
project is bad the payo® for the follower equals UL
F = UL
L = 0. So, if the project
is bad the follower observes this due to the information spillover and thus refrains
from investment. This implies that in case of a bad project, only the leader incurs a
loss that is equal to the sunk costs of investment. To see who is in the best position,
the leader or the follower, the magnitudes of the ¯rst and second mover advantages
1The assumption that the follower reacts immediately might seem unrealistic, but is not very
restrictive. If for example there is a time lag between investment of the leader and the follower this
only has an in°uence on the payo®s via extra discounting by the follower. The important point is
that the game ends as soon as one ¯rm has invested, because then the decision of the other ¯rm is
made as well. The fact that actual investment may take place at a later date is irrelevant for the
qualitative analysis.
6have to be compared.
If both ¯rms invest simultaneously and the project turns out to be good, both
receive UH
M > 0, where UH
F < UH
M < UH
L . The revenues can be seen as an in¯nite
stream of payo®s ¼i







i = H;L, j = L;M;F. Example 1 illustrates this framework.
Example 1 Consider a new market for a homogeneous good. Two ¯rms have the
opportunity to enter the market, that can be either good or bad. Let market demand
be given by P(Q) = Y ¡ Q for some Y > 0 if the market is good (H) and by
P(Q) = 0 if the market is bad (L). The cost function is given by C(q) = cq, for
some 0 · c · Y . It is assumed that if the ¯rms invest they engage in quantity




M = 0. Suppose that there is one ¯rm that invests in the
market ¯rst. This ¯rm then is the Stackelberg leader.2 In case the market is good




rqF[P(qL + qF) ¡ c];
where r is the discount rate. This yields qF =
Y ¡c¡qL
2 . Using this reaction, the leader
maximises its stream of pro¯ts. Solving the corresponding maximisation problem
yields qL = Y ¡c
2 , which results in qF = Y ¡c







16r , respectively. In case both ¯rms invest simultaneously, the Cournot-
Nash outcome prevails. Straightforward computations yield UH
M =
(Y ¡c)2





It is assumed that both ¯rms have an identical belief p 2 [0;1] in the project
being good. This belief is assumed to be common knowledge. If the leader invests
at a point in time where the belief in a good project equals p, the leader's ex ante
expected payo® equals
L(p) = p(UH
L ¡ I) + (1 ¡ p)(¡I) = pUH
L ¡ I:
The follower only invests in case of a good project. Therefore, if the leader invests




2It is assumed that ¯rms can only set capacity once, thereby ¯xing the production level forever.
This resolves the commitment problem mentioned in Dixit (1980).
3The assumption of an in¯nite Stackelberg advantage may seem to be highly restrictive and
unrealistic. For our framework, however, this assumption is not essential. The main point is that it
should be the case that the ¯rst mover has a higher discounted present value if the market is good.
This could also be established by a temporary Stackelberg advantage.




De¯ne by pM the belief such that the ex ante expected pro¯t for the follower equals
the ex ante expected pro¯t of simultaneous investment, i.e. pM is such that F(pM) =
M(pM). Note that, when p ¸ pM, both ¯rms will always invest simultaneously, i.e.





L(p) if p < pM;
M(p) if p ¸ pM;





F(p) if p < pM;
M(p) if p ¸ pM;




















Figure 1: Payo® functions.
At the moment that the investment opportunity becomes available, both ¯rms
have an identical prior belief about the project yielding high revenues, say p0 2 (0;1),
which is common knowledge. Occasionally, the ¯rms obtain information in the form
of signals about the pro¯tability of the project. These signals are observed by both
¯rms simultaneously and are assumed to arrive according to a Poisson process with
parameter ¹ > 0. Information arriving over time will in general be heterogeneous
regarding the indication of the pro¯tability level of the project. We distinguish
two types of signals: a signal can either indicate high revenues (an h-signal) or low
8revenues (an l-signal). A signal revealing the true state of the project occurs with
the common knowledge probability ¸ > 1
2, see Table 1.4
h l
H ¸ 1 ¡ ¸
L 1 ¡ ¸ ¸
Table 1: Conditional probabilities of h- and l-signals.
Let n denote the number of signals and let g and b be the number of h-signals
and l-signals, respectively, so that n = g+b. Given that at a certain point in time n
signals have arrived, g of which were h-signals, the ¯rms then calculate their belief
in a good project in a Bayesian way. De¯ne k = 2g¡n = g¡b so that k > 0 (k < 0)
indicates that more (less) h-signals than l-signals have arrived. After de¯ning the
prior odds of a bad project as ³ =
1¡p0
p0 , it is obtained from Thijssen et al. (2003)
that the (conditional) belief in a good project is a function of k and is given by
p(k) =
¸k
¸k + ³(1 ¡ ¸)k: (1)
Note that the inverse of this function gives the number of h-signals in excess of








3 Exogenous Firm Roles
Before we turn to the case where it is endogenously determined which ¯rm invests
¯rst, we now look at the simpler case of exogenous ¯rm roles. There are two sym-
metric cases, namely one being that only ¯rm 1 is allowed to be the ¯rst investor and
the other being its symmetric counterpart. Suppose that only ¯rm 1 is allowed to
be the ¯rst investor. Then ¯rm 1 does not need to take into account the possibility
that ¯rm 2 preempts. Firm 2 can choose between the follower role, i.e. waiting to
incur the second mover advantage, and investing at the same time as ¯rm 1, i.e.
without waiting for the true state of the project to become known. These two cases
lead to di®erent forms of competition if the project turns out to be pro¯table. In
the ¯rst case a Stackelberg equilibrium arises, whereas in the latter case a Cournot
4Without loss of generality it can be assumed that ¸ >
1
2, since if the converse holds we can
rede¯ne the h-signals to be l-signals and vice versa. Then a signal again reveals the true state of
the project with probability 1 ¡ ¸ >
1
2. If ¸ =
1
2 the signal is uninformative and, consequently, the
value of waiting disappears.
9equilibrium is to be expected. Firm 1 should invest at the point in time at which
its belief in a good project exceeds a certain threshold. In case of the Stackelberg
equilibrium it holds that, analogous to Thijssen et al. (2003), that this threshold








¯(r + ¹)(r + ¹(1 ¡ ¸)) ¡ ¹¸(1 ¡ ¸)(r + ¹(1 + ¯ ¡ ¸))










¹ + 1)2 ¡ 4¸(1 ¡ ¸):
Hence, as soon as p exceeds pL, the leader invests. Then, the follower immediately
decides whether or not to invest, based on the true state of the project that is
immediately revealed after the investment by the leader. Note that pL will not be
hit exactly, since the belief p(k) jumps alongside with the discrete variable k. Hence,
the leader invests when p = p(dkLe), where kL = k(pL).
The above story only holds if p(dkLe) < pM. If the converse holds, ¯rm 1 knows
that ¯rm 2 will not choose the follower role, but will invest immediately as well
yielding UH
M instead of UH
L if the project turns out to be good. Then a Cournot




M=I ¡ 1) + 1
:
Note that since UH
L > UH
M it holds that ~ pL > pL.
When p0 is contained in the region (pM;1], both ¯rms will immediately invest,
yielding for both a discounted payo® stream UH
M ¡I if the project is good, and ¡I if
the project is bad. Like in the Cournot equilibrium, here too the belief is such that
the follower prefers to receive the simultaneous investment payo® rather than being
a follower, implying that it takes the risk of making a loss that equals the sunk costs
of investment when the project value is low.
4 Endogenous Firm Roles
Let the ¯rm roles now be endogenous, which implies that both ¯rms can be the ¯rst
investor. De¯ne the preemption belief, denoted by pP, to be the belief at which the








10Note that pP < pM. As soon as p reaches pP (if ever), both ¯rms want to be the
leader and try to preempt each other, which erodes the option value of waiting.
It does not vanish completely, however, since L(pP) > 0. This indicates that the
net present value of the investment of the preemptor is still positive. Furthermore,
de¯ne kP = k(pP). For the analysis an important part is played by the positioning
of kL, which can be smaller or larger than kP. Since k is monotonically increasing
in p, from (3) and (4) it follows that







Note that if kL > kP then dkLe ¸ dkPe. The right-hand side of the second inequality
in (5) can be seen as the relative price that the follower pays for waiting to obtain the
information spillover. Since ª decreases with ¸ and (in general) with ¹ (see Thijssen
et al. (2003)), ª increases with the value of the information spillover. For if ª is
low, the quality and the quantity of the signals are relatively high. Therefore, if a
¯rm becomes the leader it provides relatively less information to its competitor for
low values of ª compared to when ª is high. So, expression (5) implies a comparison
between the ¯rst mover advantage and the second mover advantage. In what follows
we consider the two cases dkLe ¸ dkPe and dkLe < dkPe.
4.1 The Case Where the Leader Advantage Outweighs the Infor-
mation Spillover
Suppose that dkLe ¸ dkPe. In this case ¯rms start to duel over the leader role as
soon as k = dkPe, whereas an exogenously assigned leader would wait until k = dkLe.
This implies that ¯rms try to preempt each other in investing in the project. We
apply the equilibrium concept introduced in Fudenberg and Tirole (1985), which
is extended for the present setting involving uncertainty in Thijssen et al. (2002),
to solve the game. In Appendix A a brief review of the appropriate strategy and
equilibrium concepts can be found. The application of this equilibrium concept
requires the use of several stopping times. De¯ne for all starting points t0 ¸ 0,
T
t0
P = infft ¸ t0jpt ¸ pPg and T
t0
M = infft ¸ t0jpt ¸ pMg, where pt ´ p(kt) and kt





for all t0 ¸ 0. In what follows we consider three di®erent starting points, namely
pt0 ¸ pM, pP · pt0 < pM and pt0 < pP.
If pt0 ¸ pM the value of simultaneous investment is greater than or equal to the
value of being the second investor. If the inequality is strict this implies that no ¯rm
wants to be the follower and hence that both ¯rms will invest immediately. If pt0 =
11pM ¯rms are indi®erent between being the follower and simultaneous investment.5
Next, let pP · pt0 < pM be the starting point of the game. Both ¯rms try
to preempt in this scenario, since the value for the leader is higher than the value
for the follower. This implies that in a symmetric equilibrium6 each ¯rm invests
with a positive probability. Here both ¯rms want to be the ¯rst investor, since the
expected Stackelberg leader payo® is su±ciently high. Equivalently, the belief in a
good project is su±ciently high for taking the risk that the project has a low payo®
to be optimal. On the other hand, if the ¯rms invest with positive probability, the
probability that both ¯rms simultaneously invest is also positive. This would lead
to the simultaneous investment (Cournot-Nash) payo®. However, since t0 < T
t0
M this
payo® is not high enough for simultaneous investment as such to be optimal. We
conclude that there is a trade-o® here between getting the high payo® as a leader
or a low payo® that is in°uenced by the risk of investing in a bad project as a
leader, the lower payo® of being the follower, and the lower payo® of (a suboptimal)
simultaneous investment. As is proved in Proposition 1 below, the probability that
a ¯rm invests equals
L(p)¡M(p)
L(p)¡2M(p)+F(p). Hence, this probability decreases with the
di®erence between the leader and the simultaneous investment payo®. This happens
because if this di®erence is large the ¯rms will try to avoid simultaneous investment
by lowering their investment probability.
From Thijssen et al. (2002) it is known that it is optimal if one of the two ¯rms
invests as soon as the preemption region is reached. The equilibrium strategies are
such that the probability that at least one ¯rm invests equals one.7 Since immedi-
ately after investment by the leader the follower decides on investment, the game
ends exactly at the point in time where the preemption region is reached. Again,
the position of pL is of no importance, since the leader curve lies above the follower
curve, implying that both ¯rms will try to become the leader.
The last region is the region where pt0 < pP. As long as t0 · t < T
t0
P , the leader
curve lies under the follower curve, and since in this case kL ¸ kP, pL has not been
5Note that whether or not pM > pL is irrelevant. For suppose that pM · pL. Then no ¯rm
would be willing to wait until pL is reached, because of the sheer fear of being preempted by the
other ¯rm.
6Since the ¯rms are identical, a symmetric equilibrium seems to be the most plausible candidate.
See Thijssen et al. (2002) for a more elaborate discussion of this point.
7Note that the probability of simultaneous investment at T
t0
P is strictly positive, even if t0 < T
t0
P .
This happens because the preemption point will not be hit exactly due to the discontinuity of the
stochastic process governing the evolution of p. In the standard game theoretic real options literature
(e.g. Weeds (2002)) one uses a less complicated equilibrium concept and simply assumes that the
probability of simultaneous investment at the preemption point equals zero. Such an assumption
would be unjusti¯ed here.
12reached yet. Hence, no ¯rm wants to be the leader and both ¯rms abstain from
investment until enough h-signals have arrived to make investment more attractive
than waiting.
Formally, the above discussion can be summarised in a consistent ®-equilibrium.
This equilibrium concept for game theoretic real options models is described in detail
in Thijssen et al. (2002). The strategies used in these timing games consist of a
cumulative distribution function Gt0(¢), where G
t0
i (t) gives the probability that ¯rm
i has invested before and including time t ¸ t0, and an intensity function ®t0(¢).
The intensity function serves as an endogenous coordination device in cases where
it is optimal for one ¯rm to invest but not for both. In coordinating ¯rms make a
trade-o® between succeeding in investing ¯rst and the risk of both investing at the
same time. For details, see Appendix A.





L ¡I , then a symmetric consistent ®-equilibrium is given
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P · s < Tt
M,
1 if s ¸ Tt
M.
(7)
For a proof of this proposition, see Appendix B.
4.2 The Case Where the Information Spillover Outweighs the Leader
E®ect
Suppose that pL < pP. Now the problem becomes somewhat di®erent. Let t0 ¸ 0.
For t > T
t0
P the game is exactly the same as in the former case. The di®erence arises
if t ¸ t0 is such that pt 2 [pL;pP). In this region it would have been optimal to invest
for the leader in case the leader role had been determined exogenously. However,
since the leader role is endogenous and the leader curve lies below the follower curve,
both ¯rms prefer to be the follower. In other words, a war of attrition (cf. Hendricks
et al. (1988)) arises. Two asymmetric equilibria of the war of attrition arise trivially:
¯rm 1 invests always with probability one and ¯rm 2 always with probability zero,
13and vice versa. However, since the ¯rms are assumed to be identical there is no a
priori reason to expect that they coordinate on one of these asymmetric equilibria.
We know that the game ends as soon as T
t0
P is reached. Note, however, that
before this happens pL can be reached several times, depending on the arrival of
h- and l-signals. There is a war of attrition for k 2 K = fdkLe;:::;dkPe ¡ 1g. To
keep track of the points in time where a war of attrition occurs, de¯ne the following
increasing sequence of stopping times: T
t0
1 = infft ¸ t0jpt = dpLeg, T
t0
n+1 = infft >
Tt0
n j9k2K : pt = p(k)g, n = 1;2;3;:::, with the corresponding levels of h-signals
in excess of l-signals kn = k(pT
t0
n ). Note that n is the number of signals that have
arrived up until and including time T t0
n since the ¯rst time the war of attrition region
has been reached.
To ¯nd a symmetric equilibrium we argue in line with Fudenberg and Tirole
(1991) that for each point in time during a war of attrition the expected revenue
of investing directly exactly equals the value of waiting a small period of time dt
and investing when a new signal arrives.8 The expected value of investing at each
point in time depends on the value of k at that point in time. Let kt 2 K for some
t ¸ t0. Denoting the probability that the other ¯rm invests at belief p(kt) by °(kt),
the expected value of investing at time t equals
V1(pt) = °(kt)M(pt) + (1 ¡ °(kt))L(pt): (8)
The value of waiting for an in¯nitesimal small amount of time equals the weighted
value of becoming the follower and of both ¯rms waiting, i.e.
V2(pt) = °(kt)F(pt) + (1 ¡ °(kt))~ V (pt); (9)
where ~ V (p) is the value of waiting when neither ¯rm invests. Let °(¢) be such that
V1(¢) = V2(¢).
To actually calculate °(k) for all k 2 K, we use the fact that only for certain
values of p the probability of investment needs to be calculated. These probabilities
are the beliefs that result from the signals, i.e. for the beliefs p such that p = p(k),
k 2 K. For notational convenience we take k as dependent variable instead of p.
For example, we write V (k) instead of V (p(k)). To calculate the isolated atoms {
the probabilities of investment { in the war of attrition, °(¢), the value of waiting
~ V (¢) needs to be determined. It is governed by the following equation:
~ V (k) =e¡rdtf(1 ¡ ¹dt)~ V (k) + ¹dt[p(k)(¸V1(k + 1) + (1 ¡ ¸)V1(k ¡ 1))+
+ (1 ¡ p(k))(¸V1(k ¡ 1) + (1 ¡ ¸)V1(k + 1))]g:
(10)
8It might seem strange that a ¯rm then also invests when a bad signal arrives. Note, however,
that it is always optimal for one ¯rm to invest in the war of attrition region. The probability of
investment is most likely lower for lower values of p.
14Eq. (10) arises from equalizing the value of ~ V (k) to the value an in¯nitesimally small
amount of time later. In this small time interval, nothing happens with probability
1¡¹dt. With probability ¹dt a signal arrives. The belief a ¯rm has in a good project
is given by p(k). If the project is indeed good, an h-signal arrives with probability
¸, and an l-signal arrives with probability 1 ¡ ¸. Vice versa if the project is bad.
If a signal arrives then investing yields either V1(k + 1) or V1(k ¡ 1). After letting
dt # 0 and substituting eqs. (1) and (8) into eq. (10) it is obtained that
~ V (k) =
¹
r + ¹
h¸k+1 + ³(1 ¡ ¸)k+1
¸k + ³(1 ¡ ¸)k
¡
°(k + 1)M(k + 1) + (1 ¡ °(k + 1))
L(k + 1)
¢
+ ¸(1 ¡ ¸)
¸k¡1 + ³(1 ¡ ¸)k¡1
¸k + ³(1 ¡ ¸)k
¡
°(k ¡ 1)M(k ¡ 1)




Substituting eq. (11) into eq. (9) yields, after equating eqs. (9) and (8) and
rearranging:
ak°(k) + bk = (1 ¡ °(k))(ck°(k + 1) + dk°(k ¡ 1) + ek); (12)
where





¸k+1 + ³(1 ¡ ¸)k+1
¸k + ³(1 ¡ ¸)k
¡







¸k¡1 + ³(1 ¡ ¸)k¡1
¸k + ³(1 ¡ ¸)k
¡






³¸k+1 + ³(1 ¡ ¸)k+1
¸k + ³(1 ¡ ¸)k L(k + 1)
+ ¸(1 ¡ ¸)
¸k¡1 + ³(1 ¡ ¸)k¡1
¸k + ³(1 ¡ ¸)k L(k ¡ 1)
´
:
To solve for °(¢) note that if k < dkLe, no ¯rm will invest, since the option value of
waiting is higher than the expected revenues of investing. Therefore °(dkLe) = 0.
On the other hand, if k ¸ dkPe the ¯rms know that they enter a preemption game,




P) can be obtained from Proposition 1. Note that
it is possible that dkPe = dkMe. Then the game proceeds from the war of attrition
directly into the region where simultaneous investment is optimal. This happens if
Tt
M = Tt
P. In this case the expected payo® is governed by M(¢). For other values of
k, we have to solve a system of equations, where the k-th entry is given by eq. (12).
The complete system can be written as
diag(°)A° + B° = b; (13)
15for appropriately chosen matrices A and B, and vector b. The system of equations
(13) cannot be solved analytically. However, for any speci¯c set of parameter values,
a numerical solution can be determined. The following lemma shows that a solution
always exists. The proof can be found in Appendix C.
Lemma 1 The system of equations (13) has a solution. Furthermore, °(k) 2 [0;1]
for all k 2 K.
De¯ne nt = supfnjTt0
n · tg to be the number of signals that has arrived up until
time t ¸ t0. In the following proposition a symmetric consistent ®-equilibrium is
given.
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P · s < Tt
M,
1 if s ¸ Tt
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P · s < Tt
M,
1 if s ¸ Tt
M.
(15)
The proof of Proposition 2 can be found in Appendix D.
An illustration of the case where the second mover advantage outweighs the ¯rst
mover advantage can be found in the following example.
Example 2 Consider a situation whose characteristics are given in Table 2. For
UH
L = 13:3 r = 0:1
UH
F = 13 ¹ = 2
UH
M = 13:2 ¸ = 0:7
I = 2 p0 = 0:5
Table 2: Parameter values.
this example the preemption belief equals pP = 0:87. The minimal belief that an
exogenous leader needs to invest optimally is given by pL = 0:51. Using eq. (2) this
16implies that a war of attrition arises for k 2 f1;2g. Solving the system of equations
given in (13) yields the vector of probabilities with which each ¯rm invests in the
project. It yields °(1) = 0:4547 and °(2) = 0:7613.
From this example one can see that the probability of investment increases rapidly
and is substantial. Both ¯rms know that, given that the project is good, it is better
to become the leader. So, as the belief in a good project increases, both ¯rms invest
with higher probability.
5 Welfare Analysis
Welfare e®ects resulting from investment under uncertainty have been reported by
e.g. Jensen (1992b) and Stenbacka and Tombak (1994). In both papers the timing
of investment does not depend on the arrival of signals. In these papers the un-
certainty comprises the time needed to successfully implement the investment, i.e.
the time between investment and the successful implementation of the investment is
stochastic. The models in Jensen (1992b) and Stenbacka and Tombak (1994) allow
for the critical levels to be explicit points in time. In our model, the critical level
is not measured in units of time but measured as a probability, i.e. a belief. To
perform a welfare analysis, however, it is necessary to incorporate the time element
in the model.
For simplicity we only consider preemption cases (p0 < pP < pL). The resulting
equilibrium implies that as soon as dkPe is reached, at least one ¯rm invests and
the game ends. We analyse two questions relating to welfare that, at ¯rst sight,
are expected to have obvious answers. First, we investigate if more and/or better
information leads to higher levels of expected ex ante welfare. Secondly, we analyse if
competition (in duopoly) is better from a social welfare point of view than monopoly.
Given the belief in a good project p 2 [pP;pM), the probability of simultaneous
investment, denoted by b(p), is given by (cf. (7) and (17)):
b(p) =
L(p) ¡ F(p)
L(p) ¡ 2M(p) + F(p)
:
Let CSl
M denote the discounted value of consumer surplus if the project is l 2 fL;Hg
and simultaneous investment takes place. Furthermore, let CSH
S and CSL denote
the in¯nite discounted stream of consumer surplus in the Stackelberg equilibrium if
the project is good, and the in¯nite discounted stream of consumer surplus if the
project is bad and one ¯rm invests, respectively.
If the critical number of h-signals in excess of l-signals is given by k ¸ 0 with
¯rst passage time t, the expected discounted total surplus if the project gives high
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The expected total surplus with critical level k and ¯rst passage time t is then given
by
W(k;t) = p(k)ESH(k;t) + (1 ¡ p(k))ESL(k;t):
To incorporate the uncertainty regarding the ¯rst passage time through k, we
de¯ne the ex ante expected total welfare W(k) to be the expectation of W(k;t) over
the ¯rst passage time through k. That is,









where fk(¢) is the probability density function (pdf) of the ¯rst passage time through
k.
The pdf of the ¯rst passage time through k ¸ 0 is given in the following propo-
sition, the proof of which can be found in Appendix E.
Proposition 3 Let k0 = 0 a.s. The probability density function fk(¢) of the ¯rst





















is the modi¯ed Bessel function with parameter ½ and ¡(¢) denotes the gamma func-
tion.
In the remainder, let CSmon and Wmon denote the present value of the in¯nite
°ow of consumer surplus and the ex ante expected total surplus, respectively, in
the case of a monopolist. The critical level of investment for the monopoly case is
obtained from Thijssen et al. (2003). We use the economic situation described in
Example 1, i.e. a new market model with a±ne demand and linear costs. Consider
the parametrization as given in Table 3. From Example 1 we can conclude that
18Y = 5 r = 0:1
c = 2 p0 = 0:4
I = 5
Table 3: Parameter values.
the monopoly price is given by Pmon = Y +c
2 , the price in case of simultaneous
investment equals PM = Y +2c
3 , and the price in the Stackelberg case is given by
PS = Y +3c
4 . Given that the market is good, the °ow of consumer surplus is then
represented by
R Y
PP P¡1(p)dp = 1





2(Y ¡ Pmon)2dt =
(Y ¡Pmon)2







32r , and CSL
mon = CSL
M = CSL = 0.
We want to analyse the e®ect of the quantity and quality of information on
welfare in both the monopolistic and the duopoly case. First, consider the case
where ¸ = 0:6 and ¹ varies from 2 up to 5. Calculations lead to Figure 2. As can






















Figure 2: Welfare as a function of ¹.
be seen from the ¯gure, one cannot derive a clear-cut result saying that competition
is better than monopoly or vice versa. This is caused by the discreteness of the
investment threshold. In the duopoly case a Stackelberg equilibrium arises for all
values of ¹, while the investment threshold always equals dkde = 1. From (4) one
can see that pP is independent of both ¹ and ¸ and that k(p) is independent of ¹.
Hence, dkde cannot di®er for varying values of ¹. As ¹ increases welfare improves,
because more information is (in this case) better. The jump in the curve for welfare
under monopoly occurs because at ¹ ¼ 3 the investment threshold dkme jumps from
1 to 2. This happens since km is increasing in ¹, which implies that dkme exhibits
upward jumps for some values of ¹, while it is constant otherwise. As soon as there
19is a jump, the monopolist waits longer, which reduces both the risk of investing in a
bad market as well as expected consumer surplus. From the above it becomes clear
that the latter e®ect dominates, implying that the intuition that more information
is always better cannot be sustained.
Secondly, we analyse the e®ect of the quality of information on welfare by taking
¹ = 4 and by letting ¸ vary from 0.55 to 0.8. This yields Figure 3. The jumps occur


















Figure 3: Welfare as a function of ¸.
due to the discreteness of the investment threshold just as before. We will describe
monopoly and duopoly separately to get some feeling for the di®erent e®ects at
work. First, let us consider the monopoly case. At ¸ ¼ 0:575, dkme jumps from 1
to 2, which accounts for the drop in welfare. For the remainder of the domain, an
increase in ¸ reduces the risk of investment while the market is bad and accelerates
investment, which results in increasing expected consumer and producer surplus and
thus in higher welfare levels.
In the duopoly case there are more e®ects. The jump at ¸ ¼ 0:57 occurs since
dkde jumps from 2 to 1 (although pP remains constant), since less signals are needed
to reach pP. This is good for expected consumer surplus, hence the increase. For
¸ between 0.57 and 0.635, a Stackelberg or a Cournot equilibrium arises. Welfare
decreases over this range since for increasing ¸ the probability of simultaneous in-
vestment at the preemption point increases monotonically.9 In case of simultaneous
investment both ¯rms do not wait for the outcome of the other ¯rm's investment.
Hence, they both invest without knowing beforehand the state of the market. This
implies that in case of a bad market the sunk investment costs is lost twice for the
whole market. Therefore, the loss (due to sunk investment costs) in case the mar-
9This is not an analytical result. The probability of simultaneous investment can also decrease
with increasing ¸.
20ket turns out to be bad is increasing in ¸ which has a negative e®ect on welfare.
From ¸ ¼ 0:635 onwards, a Cournot equilibrium arises where both ¯rms always
invest simultaneous. Higher ¸ means that signals are more reliable. Therefore, the
probability of simultaneous investment in a bad market is smaller, which increases
expected producer surplus and thus enhances expected welfare, although the welfare
level is lower than under monopoly.
A ¯nal remark concerns the range where ¸ is in between 0.55 and 0.65. Here
dkme = 1 and dkde = 2, i.e. in a monopolistic market investment takes place at an
earlier date than in a duopoly, given an identical sample path of the information
process. This is due to the fact that the discounted value of the project is higher for
a monopolist than for a ¯rm that faces competition. This higher discounted value
has a dampening e®ect on the waiting time.
From these examples two observations can be made. Firstly, more or better
information does not always lead to higher welfare. This is mainly due to opposing
e®ects in°uencing the expected producer surplus. Expected consumer surplus in
general increases in the quality and quantity of information. An exception arises in
the monopoly case where the threshold level dkme can jump upwards. This happens
because of the fact that the increase in the value of waiting delays investment, which
is bad for consumer surplus. In the duopoly case there is another e®ect regarding
the quality of information. In a range where both a Stackelberg and a Cournot-Nash
equilibrium can occur the probability of joint investment at the preemption point
can increase, if information gets qualitatively better. This has a negative in°uence
on producer surplus, since if the market turns out to be bad both ¯rms will lose the
sunk costs I. The magnitude of these sunk-costs might not o®set the increase in
expected consumer surplus due to earlier investment.
The second observation is that it is not clear whether a monopolistic or an
oligopolistic market structure is desirable from an ex ante social welfare perspective.
To get a better insight in this problem, consider an example with Y = 60, c = 20,
I = 500, p0 = 0:4 and r = 0:1. We take ¹ 2 [0:5;4] and ¸ 2 [0:6;0:9] and compare
welfare for monopoly and duopoly. This is depicted in Figure 4. From the ¯gure one
gets the impression that "bad" information (i.e. low ¹ and low ¸) seems to favour
a duopolistic structure, whereas "good" information (i.e. high ¹ and high ¸) seems
to favour a monopolistic market structure.
To test this hypothesis we simulate the model. In each run we sample (Y ¡c) »





interest rate is set to r = 0:1 and the prior belief in a good market at p0 =
0:4. We sample 1000 instances of "bad" information with ¹L » U[0:5;1:5] and
¸L » U[0:6;0:7], and 1000 instances of "good" information with ¹H » U[3;4] and
















Figure 4: Regions of higher welfare (monopoly or duopoly) for di®erent (¹;¸)-
combinations. Wmon (Wduo) denotes welfare in the monopoly (duopoly) case.
¸H » U[0:8;0:9]. This leads to four series of simulated expected ex ante welfare lev-




duo. Since we hypothesise
that I E(WL
duo) > I E(WL
mon) and I E(WH
mon) > I E(WH
duo), we test the null-hypotheses
H0 : I E(WL
duo¡WL
mon) · 0 and H0 : I E(WH
mon¡WH
duo) · 0. Using standard asymptot-
ically normal tests, both null-hypotheses are rejected at 5%.10 So, we ¯nd evidence
that a duopoly leads to a signi¯cantly higher level of expected ex ante welfare than
monopoly if the information is relatively bad, whereas the reverse holds if informa-
tion is relatively good. Intuitively, one can see that if information is bad, the value
to wait for a monopolist is very low. Therefore, he will invest soon. On the other
hand, in the duopoly case, although the preemption level may be reached soon, the
probability of joint investment is low and this dampens the negative preemptive
e®ect on expected producer surplus. If information is good, ¯rms are more likely to
simultaneously invest which is bad for expected producer surplus. So, in expectation
the preemption e®ect "hurts" more if information is good. Moreover, the value of
waiting increases when signals become more valuable, or occur more frequently. In
the monopoly case this value of waiting is fully taken into account, whereas in a
duopoly ¯rms still intend to invest quickly to preempt their rival.
In the above analysis only the preemption case is considered. From a mathemati-
cal point of view the advantage of considering the preemption case is that one knows
that the game stops as soon as the preemption level is reached. This allows for the
10Let (x1;:::;xn) be a sample of iid draws with I E(x) = ¹, V ar(x) = ¾
2, sample mean ¹ x, and
sample variance ^ ¾
2. For testing H0 : ¹ · 0 we use the test statistic T =
p
n¹ x
^ ¾2 , which under the
null-hypothesis has a standard normal distribution. In our case we get T = 4:45 and T = 30:60,
respectively.
22use of the distribution of the ¯rst passage time in the de¯nition of ex ante expected
total surplus. In case the information spillover outweighs the Stackelberg e®ect a
war of attrition arises. To make a comparable welfare analysis for this case one has
to consider all possible paths for the arrival of signals before the preemption region
is hit. So, not only the distribution for the ¯rst passage time, but the distribution of
second, third, etc. passage times for values k 2 K have to be considered, conditional
on the fact that the preemption value is not reached. Such an analysis is not analyt-
ically tractable. However, one could estimate the ex ante expected total surplus by
use of simulations. Also in this case ambiguous results regarding the welfare e®ects
of monopoly and duopoly can be expected, depending on the position of the critical
investment level for a monopolist relative to pL. An additional e®ect concerning the
welfare comparison of monopoly and duopoly in case of a war of attrition is the free
rider e®ect. In a duopoly both ¯rms like the other to invest ¯rst so that it does not
need to take the risk that the project has low value. Consequently ¯rms invest too
late, leading to a lower expected consumer surplus.
6 Conclusions
Non-exclusivity is a main feature that distinguishes real options from their ¯nancial
counterparts (Zingales (2000)). A ¯rm having a real investment opportunity often
shares this possibility with one or more competitors and this has a negative e®ect
on pro¯ts. The implication is that, to come to a meaningful analysis of the value of
a real option, competition must be taken into account.
This paper considers a duopoly where both ¯rms have the same possibility to in-
vest in a new market with uncertain payo®s. As time passes uncertainty is gradually
resolved by the arrival of new information regarding the quality of the investment
project in the form of signals. Generally speaking, each ¯rm has the choice of being
the ¯rst or second investor. A ¯rm moving ¯rst reaches a higher market share by
having a Stackelberg advantage. However, being the second investor implies that
the investment can be undertaken knowing the payo® with certainty, since by ob-
serving the performance in the market of the ¯rst investor it is possible to obtain
full information regarding the quality of the investment project.
The outcome mainly depends on the speed at which information arrives over
time. If the quality and quantity of the signals is su±ciently high, the information
advantage of the second investor is low so that the Stackelberg advantage of the
¯rst investor dominates, which always results in a preemption game. In the other
scenario, initially a war of attrition prevails where it is preferred to wait for the
competitor to undertake the risky investment. During the time where this war of
23attrition goes on it happens with positive probability that both ¯rms refrain from
investment. It can then be the case that so many bad signals arrive that the belief
in a good project again becomes so low that the war of attrition is ended and
that no ¯rm invests for the time being. On the other hand, it can happen that so
many positive signals in excess of bad signals arrive that at some point in time the
Stackelberg advantage starts to exceed the value of the information spillover. This
then implies that the war of attrition turns into a preemption game.
From the industrial organisation literature it is known that a monopoly is bad for
social welfare. In our model the welfare issue is more complicated, mainly because
we look at expected ex ante social welfare. We ¯nd evidence that a duopolistic
market structure is more desirable in cases where there is few and qualitatively poor
information. On the other hand, a monopolistic market structure is better if quantity
and quality of information are high. The main reasons for this conclusion are, ¯rstly,
the low expected producer surplus in the duopoly case due to a high probability of
simultaneous investment, resulting in a higher probability that both ¯rms loose
the sunk investment costs. Secondly, if a lot of information arrives over time (in
expectation) the value of postponing investment increases. However, in a duopoly
framework the presence of competition still makes that investment takes place soon.
Furthermore, we show that more or better information does not necessarily lead to
higher expected welfare. In the monopoly case this is mainly due to the fact that,
again, more signals arriving over time raises the value of waiting. Therefore, the
monopolist delays investment, which is bad for consumer surplus. In the duopoly
case the resulting equilibrium market structure (Stackelberg or Cournot) plays an
important role.
Finally, departing from the modelling framework of this paper two interesting
topics for future research can be distinguished. Firstly, one could include the pos-
sibility for ¯rms to invest in the quantity and quality of the signals. This would
then give rise to an optimal R&D model, that also includes the problem of optimal
sampling. Secondly, it is interesting to allow for entry and exit in this model. This
would then lead to an analysis of the optimal number of ¯rms from a social welfare
perspective, thereby making it possible to compare with existing literature like e.g.
Mankiw and Whinston (1986).
24Appendix
A Equilibrium Concepts for Timing Games
In this appendix we brie°y review the appropriate equilibrium concepts for game
theoretic real option models that are developed in Thijssen et al. (2002). Let
(­;F;(Ft)0·t·1;P) be a ¯ltered probability space satisfying the usual hypothe-
ses, i.e. F0 contains all the P-null sets of F and the ¯ltration (Ft)0·t·1 is right-
continuous11. Let (Yt)t¸0 be a semimartingale on this ¯ltered probability space.
First we de¯ne a simple strategy for the subgame starting at t0.
De¯nition 1 A simple strategy for player i 2 f1;2g in the subgame starting at




i ) : [t0;1) £ ­ !
[0;1] £ [0;1], such that for all ! 2 ­
1. G
t0
i (¢;!) is non-decreasing and right-continuous with left limits;
2. ®
t0
i (¢;!) is right-continuous with left limits;
3. if ®
t0
i (t;!) = 0 and t = inffu ¸ t0j®
t0
i (u;!) > 0g, then the right-derivative of
®
t0
i (t;!) exists and is positive.
Denote for all ! 2 ­ the strategy set of simple strategies of player i in the subgame
starting at t0 ¸ 0 by Ss
i(t0;!). Furthermore, de¯ne the strategy space by Ss(t0;!) =
Q
i=1;2 Ss










For all ! 2 ­, the function G
t0
i is a cumulative distribution function where
G
t0
i (t;!) is the probability that ¯rm i has invested before or at time t. The function
®
t0
i (¢;!) is called the atom function and it describes a sequence of atoms. The atom
function allows for coordination between ¯rms in cases where investment by at one
¯rm is optimal, but simultaneous investment is not. The atom function replicates
discrete time results that are lost by modelling in continuous time. Brie°y stated,
as soon as the atom function is non-zero a game is played where both players invest
with probability ®i and ®j, respectively. This game is repeated until at least one





i (t;!) > 0gg:
If one denotes by I P(ij¿) the probability that ¯rm i invests at time ¿ and by I P(i;:jj¿)
that ¯rm i invests at time ¿ but ¯rm j does not, the following probabilities that are
11Ft =
T
u>t Fu, all t, 0 · t < 1.




























































The de¯nition of simple strategies does not a priori exclude the possibility that
both ¯rms choose an atom function that turns out to be inconsistent with the cumu-
lative distribution function Gt0(¢;!). In equilibrium it should naturally be the case
that inconsistencies of this kind do not occur. Therefore, we introduce the notion of
®-consistency.








i=1;2 for the subgame starting
at t0 ¸ 0 is ®-consistent if for i = 1;2 it holds that for all ! 2 ­ and t ¸ t0,
®
t0
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i (t¡;!) 6= 0 ) G
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An ®-equilibrium for the subgame starting at t0 ¸ 0 is then de¯ned as follows.




!2­, s¤(!) 2 Ss(t0;!), all
! 2 ­, is an ®-equilibrium for the subgame starting at t0 if for all ! 2 ­, s¤(!) is
®-consistent and
8i2f1;2g8si2Ss
i (t0;!) : Vi(t0;s¤(!)) ¸ Vi(t0;si;s¤
¡i(!)):
A problem with ®-equilibrium is that it does not exclude time inconsistent strategies.
To rule these out we need the notion of closed loop strategy.











i(t;!) for all t ¸ 0 that satis¯es the following intertem-
poral consistency conditions for all ! 2 ­:
1. 80·t·u·v<1 : v = inff¿ > tjY¿ = Yvg ) Gt
i(v;!) = Gu
i (v;!);
2. 80·t·u·v<1 : v = inff¿ > tjY¿ = Yvg ) ®t
i(v;!) = ®u
i (v;!).
26The set of closed loop strategies for player i 2 f1;2g is denoted by Scl
i (!). As before,




A consistent ®-equilibrium is now de¯ned as follows.




!2­, ¹ s(!) 2 Scl(!), all













is an ®-equilibrium for the subgame starting
at t.
B Proof of Proposition 1
Let (­;F;(Ft)t¸0;P) be the ¯ltered probability space underlying the stochastic
process governing the arrival of signals. First notice that for each ! 2 ­ and i = 1;2,
the strategy (Gt
i;®t
i)t2[0;1) satis¯es the intertemporal consistency and ®-consistency
conditions of De¯nitions 4 and 2, respectively. Hence, the closed loop strategies are
well-de¯ned. Let t 2 [0;1). It will be shown that (Gt
i;®t
i)i=1;2 is an ®-equilibrium
for the game starting at t. Due to discounting, it is a dominant strategy to invest
with positive probability only at points in time when new information arrives. Since
pt has non-continuous sample paths, due to the Poisson arrivals of signals, the cdf
Gt(¢) has to be a step function. We consider three cases.
1. t = Tt
M (i.e. pt ¸ pM)
Given that ¯rm j plays its closed loop strategy, ¯rm i has three possible
strategies. First, ¯rm i can play Gt
i(t) = 0, i.e. it does not invest. Then ¯rm
i's expected payo® equals F(pt). If ¯rm i invests with an isolated atom equal
to º > 0, then the expected payo® equals F(pt) + º(M(pt) ¡ F(pt)) ¸ F(pt).
Finally, suppose that ®t
i(t) = a > 0. From (17) one can see that, since ®t
j(t) =











= F(pt) + a(M(pt) ¡ F(pt)) ¸ F(pt):
So, maximizing the expected payo® gives a = 1.
2. t < Tt
P (i.e. pt < pP)
Given the strategy of ¯rm j, if ¯rm i does not invest, its value is W(pt). Since
TL ¸ TP, we know it is not optimal to invest yet. Hence, W(pt) > L(pt). If
¯rm i invests with an isolated atom equal to º > 0, then its expected payo®
equals W(pt)+º(L(pt)¡W(pt)) · W(pt). Investing with an interval of atoms,
i.e. ®t
i(t) = a > 0, gives an expected payo® equal to L(pt). Hence it is optimal
to set Gt
i(t) = 0.
273. t = Tt
P < Tt
M (i.e. pP · pt < pM)
Investing with probability zero, i.e. Gt
i(t) = 0 yields an expected payo® equal
to F(pt), given that ¯rm j plays its strategy, i.e. Gt
i(t) = 1. If ¯rm i invests
with an isolated jump equal to º > 0, then
I P(both ¯rms invest simultaneously) = º®t
j(t);
I P(¯rm i invests ¯rst) = º(1 ¡ ®t
j(t));




L(t)¡M(t) the expected payo® for ¯rm i is given by
º®t
j(t)M(pt) + º(1 ¡ ®t
j(t))L(pt) + (1 ¡ º)F(pt) = F(pt):
Finally, if ¯rm i plays ®t







j(t)M(pt) + a(1 ¡ ®t




From these cases we deduce that unilateral deviations do not yield higher expected
pro¯ts, which proves the proposition. ¤
C Proof of Lemma 1
It is easy to see that the war of attrition region K is ¯nite with cardinality, say, n.
Hence, the system in (13) gives rise to a function f : I Rn ! I Rn where the k-th entry
is given by
fk(x) = akxk + bk ¡ (1 ¡ xk)
¡
ckxk+1 + dkxk¡1 ¡ ek
¢
; k = 1;:::;n:
A solution for the system (13) is equivalent to x 2 I Rn such that f(x) = 0.
Let k 2 K and let x 2 I Rn such that xk = 1 be ¯xed. We have
fk(x) = ak + bk = M(k) ¡ L(k) ¡ F(k) + L(k) < 0; (18)
since we are in the attrition region.
Furthermore, note that
bk ¡ ek =
¸k















¸k+1 + ³(1 ¡ ¸)k+1 + ¸(1 ¡ ¸)(¸k¡1 + ³(1 ¡ ¸)k¡1)













28Using this observation we obtain that if x 2 I Rn is such that xk = 0,







¸k+1 + ³(1 ¡ ¸)k+1
¸k + ³(1 ¡ ¸)k xk+1
³





¸k¡1 + ³(1 ¡ ¸)k¡1
¸k + ³(1 ¡ ¸)k xk¡1
³




since M(k) · L(k) for all k · dkPe.
Hence, for all k 2 K and all x 2 I Rn we have xk = 0 ) fk(x) > 0 and
xk = 1 ) fk(x) < 0. Since [0;1]n is a convex and compact set and f(¢) is continuous
on [0;1]n, there exists a stationary point x¤ 2 [0;1], i.e. for all x 2 [0;1]n it holds
that xf(x¤) · x¤f(x¤).
Let k 2 f1;:::;ng. Suppose that x¤
k > 0. Then there exists an " > 0 such that
x = x¤¡"1k 2 [0;1]n, where 1k denotes the k-th unity vector. This gives fk(x¤) ¸ 0.
Similarly, if x¤
k < 1 there exists an " > 0 such that x = x¤ + "1k 2 [0;1]n. Since x¤
is a stationary point this yields fk(x¤) · 0. Hence, if 0 < x¤
k < 1 this implies that
fk(x¤) = 0. Now suppose that x¤
i = 0. Then fk(x¤) · 0, which contradicts (19).
Finally, suppose that x¤
i = 1. Then fk(x¤) ¸ 0, which contradicts (18). ¤
D Proof of Proposition 2
By Lemma 1 there exists a x 2 [0;1]n such that f(x) = 0. For all k 2 K, let
°(k) = xk. Furthermore, it is easy to see that (Gt
i;®t
i)i=1;2 satis¯es the intertemporal
and ®-consistency conditions for each t 2 [0;1).
We prove that for each subgame starting at t, the simple strategy (Gt
i;®t
i) is an
®-equilibrium. The case where t is such that pt < pL is exactly the same as the
case where t < Tt
P < Tt
M in the proof of Proposition 1. The same holds true for the
case where t = Tt
M. Consider the region for the war of attrition, i.e. t is such that
pt 2 [pL;pP). Then kt 2 K. Suppose that ¯rm i invests with an interval of atoms
and suppose ®t
i(t) = a. Then given that ¯rm j invests with an isolated jump equal
to °(kt). In analogy of (17) we get
I P(¯rm i invests ¯rst) = 1 ¡ °(kt);
I P(¯rm j invests ¯rst) = °(kt)(1 ¡ a);
I P(¯rms invest simultaneously) = a°(kt):
Hence, the expected payo® for ¯rm i is given by
a°j(kt)M(pt) + (1 ¡ °j(kt))L(pt) + °j(kt)(1 ¡ a)F(pt):
29This expected payo® is maximised for a = 0. Hence, ¯rm i will not play an interval of
atoms. Suppose ¯rm i plays an isolated atom equal to º 2 [0;1]. Then his expected
payo® equals
ºV1(pt) + (1 ¡ º)V2(pt);
and is hence independent of º since, by de¯nition, °j(kt) is such that V1(pt) = V2(pt).
Therefore, any º 2 [0;1], and in particular º = °(kt), maximises the expected payo®.
¤
E Proof of Proposition 3
The proof follows along the same lines as Feller (1971, Section 14.6). Note that the
process starts at t0 = 0 with k0 = 0 a.s. Arriving at k 6= 0 at time t > 0 can only
be possible if a jump has occurred before t. Assume that the ¯rst jump occurred at
time t¡x. The conditional probability of the position k 6= 0 at time t is denoted by
Pk(t). It is the convolution of the probability that the process was at k + 1 at time
x or at k¡1 at time x and the probability of an arrival of an l-signal or an h-signal,
respectively. Since the arrival of signals follows a Poisson process with parameter
¹ and hence the inter-arrival times are exponentially distributed with parameter ¹,










q1(k ¡ 1) =
¸k + ³(1 ¡ ¸)k
¸k¡1 + ³(1 ¡ ¸)k¡1; (21)
is the probability of reaching state k from state k ¡ 1 and
q2(k + 1) = ¸(1 ¡ ¸)
¸k + ³(1 ¡ ¸)k
¸k+1 + ³(1 ¡ ¸)k+1; (22)
is the probability of reaching state k from state k+1. That is, Pk(t) is the convolution
of the distribution of reaching k + 1 or k ¡ 1 at time t ¡ x and the distribution of
the arrival of one signal in the interval (t ¡ x;t]. For k = 0, the probability of no
jump up to t, 1 ¡
R t
0 ¹e¡¹tdt = e¡¹t must be added, i.e.



















[q1(¡1)¼¡1(°) + q2(1)¼1(°)]: (25)
30By substituting eqs. (21) and (22) into eq. (24) one obtains the following second
order linear di®erence equation




¸k + ³(1 ¡ ¸)k:
The roots of the characteristic equation of eq. (26) are
¯° =
¹ + ° ¡
p





¹ + ° +
p






¹ + ° ¡
p














Note that for k ¸ 0 it holds that ¯k
° ! 0 as ° ! 1, but that ¾k
° ! 1 as ° ! 1.
Since ¼k(°) and hence Fk(°) are bounded as ° ! 1, we get for k ¸ 0 that B° = 0.






° k ¸ 0
1
¸(1¡¸)F0(°)¯¡k













° ¼0(°) k < 0;
(27)





(¹ + °)¸(1 ¡ ¸) ¡ ¹(1 + ¸2(1 ¡ ¸)2)
:
Hence, eq. (27) is well-de¯ned.
If at time t the process is at k ¸ 0, the ¯rst passage through k must have occurred
at time ¿ · t. In this case, the conditional probability of being at k again at time
31t equals the probability of being at state 0 at time t ¡ ¿ times the probability of a




Fk(¿)P0(t ¡ ¿)d¿; (28)
where Fk(¢) is the distribution of the ¯rst passage time through k. The Laplace
transform of eq. (28) is given by
¼k(°) = fk(°)¼0(°):




°. Feller (1971) shows that for ° > 1, (° ¡
p
°2 ¡ 1)k is the
Laplace transform of the density k





change of scale and applying the mapping ° 7! ° + ¹ re°ects multiplication of the
density by e¡¹t. Applying both mappings gives
(° ¡
p
°2 ¡ 1)k 7!
Ã
° + ¹ ¡
p





























which proves the proposition. ¤
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